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1
How to Study Ownership and 
regulation
D e s  F r e e d m a n
Why Bother?
Outbreaks of interest in questions of media 
ownership or broadcast regulation have 
long been confined to controversies about 
‘inappropriate’ media content and the use of 
‘indecent’ language. George Carlin’s broad-
cast profanities in the 1970s and Janet 
Jackson’s exposed breast at the 2004 
Superbowl are far more likely triggers of 
public concern about the structure and behav-
iour of television industries than a sober 
commitment to viewpoint or ownership 
diversity. But perhaps this is changing. The 
explosion of public anger that greeted the 
Federal Communications Commission’s 
attempt in 2003 to liberalize broadcast own-
ership rules (explored in McChesney, 2004) 
has been followed by the unprecedented 
spectacle of a Presidential candidate actually 
going to the stump armed with speeches on 
media ownership.
This is precisely what Barack Obama did 
in his 2008 presidential campaign where his 
election pamphlets promised that a President 
Obama would ‘encourage diversity in the 
ownership of broadcast media, promote the 
development of new media outlets for expres-
sion of diverse viewpoints, and clarify the 
public interest obligations of broadcasters 
who occupy the nation’s spectrum’ (Obama, 
2008). In an interview with Broadcasting & 
Cable during the campaign, Obama argued 
that the consolidation of media markets was 
leading to ‘less diversity of opinion, less local 
news coverage, replication of the same stories 
across multiple outlets’ and promised that 
‘[w]e can do better’ (quoted in Eggerton, 2008).
Obama would most likely have wanted to 
wait a little longer before this commitment was 
tested. In December 2009, the nation’s larg-
est cable and broadband provider, Comcast, 
agreed to merge with the Hollywood giant 
NBC Universal in a $30 billion deal. The 
new company would control 20 per cent of 
all viewing hours in the US and one of every 
seven television channels and would have a 
dominant position in existing and emerging 
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content markets. Political battle lines were 
soon drawn: The New York Times, on one 
side, argued that the merger ‘could limit 
choices and raise prices for viewers and 
advertisers’ (editorial, 7 December 2009) 
while the Wall Street Journal, on the other, 
insisted that any evaluation of the merger was 
‘a determination best made by the market-
place, not by anticorporate activists’ (edito-
rial, 6 December 2009). Opponents of media 
consolidation lined up against supporters of 
greater deregulation, with the implications 
for democracy and diversity placed at the 
heart of the debate.
The problem for Obama was that he was 
immediately implicated in the networks of 
influence and power that surrounded the deal. 
The Comcast chief executive had made sig-
nificant donations to the Democrats since 
2006 and had helped raise approximately 
$6 million dollars for Obama’s 2008 election 
campaign; Comcast’s VP had contributed 
some $180,000 in the same period while the 
chief executive of General Electric, owner 
of NBC, was a regular visitor to the Obama 
White House and a member of his Economic 
Recovery Advisory Board (Hart, 2009). 
The merger was eventually waived through 
in 2011 and was followed by the hiring by 
Comcast of Meredith Attwell Baker, one of 
the FCC commissioners who approved the 
deal, as a top lobbyist. This is just one small 
anecdote that illustrates the extent to which 
the ownership and regulation of broadcast 
outlets are deeply political phenomena that 
are connected to wider concerns about how 
we sustain and protect democratic institu-
tions that are able to act in something called 
‘the public interest’. Put simply, there is a 
widely-held belief that democracy is throttled 
if the number of media outlets and distinctive 
voices is restricted – if, in other words, media 
power is concentrated in the hands of the few 
and not the many and if it is able to evade 
public oversight and regulatory control.
So let us suppose for a moment, as some 
people do, that Rupert Murdoch, the chairman 
of News Corporation, the transnational con-
glomerate that includes amongst its portfolio, 
21st Century Fox, the Wall Street Journal, 
BSkyB, The Times, The Sun, Harper Collins 
publishing and Star Television, is a useful 
metaphor for the dangers of media concen-
tration. Mr Murdoch is known not simply for 
his business acumen but for his advocacy of a 
series of neo-liberal economic and conserva-
tive social policies including his unwavering 
support for the US and UK ‘war on terror’ and 
his staunch opposition to the European Union 
(Cassidy, 2006). In response to Murdoch’s 
ability to dominate the means through which 
public conversations take place, the Virgin 
boss Richard Branson once described him as 
a ‘threat to democracy’ (quoted in Puttnam, 
2006). Such a description rests on the con-
viction that media ownership matters and 
that, where it is concentrated, it represents an 
unacceptable challenge to pluralist principles 
of a diverse and competitive media system 
and, by extension, to the very legitimacy of a 
democratic system.
In this argument, media concentration is 
anti-democratic not simply because it under-
mines the ability of citizens to acquire and 
exchange the information and ideas neces-
sary to take informed decisions about public 
life, but because it distorts the logic of the 
media industries themselves, transforming 
them from vehicles of symbolic interaction 
to engines of capital accumulation. Consider 
Murdoch’s response in 2009 to calls for a 
bail-out of news organizations as they strug-
gle to cope with the combined impact of a 
huge drop in advertising revenue and the 
structural challenge posed by the internet. 
Welcoming the collapse of companies that 
fail to adapt to the new digital age, Murdoch 
argued that ‘they should fail, just as a restau-
rant that offers meals no one wants to eat or 
a car-maker who makes cars no one wants to 
buy should fail’ (Murdoch, 2009). This is the 
same vision of media – as commodities that 
measure their success simply using market 
criteria – as that espoused by FCC chair-
man Mark Fowler in the early 1980s when 
he described television as ‘just another appli-
ance. It’s a toaster with pictures’ (quoted in 
Horwitz, 1989: 245).
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But, as stated above, there is another 
approach to the issue of media ownership 
that ties questions of structure to those of 
performance and accountability in relation to 
democracy (as distinct from profitability or 
efficiency). Some of the founding scholars of 
media, communications and culture identified 
issues of ownership as vital to the ability of 
media to pursue an independent, imaginative 
and critical role in public life. Back in 1948, 
Lazarsfeld and Merton noted the importance 
of locating mass media within the specific 
social and economic structures in which they 
operated and argued that ‘the social effects of 
the media will vary as the system of ownership 
and control varies’ (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 
2004 [1948]: 236). More significantly, they 
insisted that ‘[s]ince the mass media are sup-
ported by great business concerns geared into 
the current social and economic system, the 
media contribute to the maintenance of this 
system’ (2004 [1948]: 236). In his impor-
tant 1962 book Communications, Raymond 
Williams, the great British theorist of cul-
ture and media, highlighted the emergence 
of new forms of media ownership that were 
contributing to a growing commodification 
of audiences and content. He argued that the 
‘methods and attitudes of capitalist business 
have established themselves near the centre 
of communications’ (Williams, 1968 [1962]: 
31), even in a media economy that contained 
a significant not-for-profit, public service 
core. ‘From this it becomes one of the pur-
poses of communication to sell a particular 
paper or programme. All the basic purposes 
of communications – the sharing of human 
 experience – can become subordinated this 
drive to sell (1968 [1962]: 32).
This chapter pursues Williams’s interest in 
the relationship between questions of owner-
ship and the media’s ability to facilitate dem-
ocratic conversations by considering not just 
why but how we should study media owner-
ship. It supplements this by reflecting on how 
we should make sense of the key mechanisms 
for shaping and monitoring this relationship: 
through the regulatory processes that continue 
to maintain oversight of the contemporary 
television environment. It considers traditional 
perspectives on ownership and regulation by 
providing a typology of different methods of 
analysis and goes on to argue for an approach 
to ownership and regulation that interrogates 
them as systems of thought and action that 
privilege particular ways of thinking about 
and ordering the world. The chapter attempts, 
in other words, to make the analysis of owner-
ship and regulation not simply necessary but 
actually provocative and empowering.
Studying oWnerShip and 
regulation aS data
The first approach to the study of media own-
ership and regulation is to treat them as 
sources of quantitative data that, when 
assessed empirically and presented methodi-
cally, produce the evidential basis for further 
types of action (i.e. ownership rules or regula-
tory interventions). Data in relation to broad-
cast ownership may include a breakdown of 
different types of ownership structure, figures 
concerning revenue and profit, the share of 
the market in terms of turnover or audience, 
levels of concentration, details of income 
streams and market predictions. Data on reg-
ulation often includes listing the various 
mechanisms through which regulation is able 
to take place (for example, quotas, content 
rules, licensing, adherence to codes and pro-
tocols, antitrust procedures and, in the case of 
negative regulation, an absence of interven-
tion) and describing their specific operations. 
Many studies have provided this information 
in an attempt to map out key features of spe-
cific broadcast environments, for example 
Compaine and Gomery (2000 [1979]) and 
Noam (2009) with reference to US media 
ownership, Kelly, Mazzoleni and McQuail 
(2004), Open Society Institute (2005) and 
Sanchez-Taberno et al. (1993) in relation to 
European ownership while Creech (2007) and 
Napoli (2001) have produced encyclopaedic 
volumes which detail all the various interven-
tions into broadcast speech and ownership.
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In the midst of the often polarized debates 
on media ownership described earlier, quan-
titative data may be seen to provide a reassur-
ing source of certainty and retains an ability 
to be mathematically precise in the midst of 
what some argue are instinctual claims and 
unsupported assertions. Noam, for example, 
insists that ‘what the world needs on the sub-
ject of media concentration is more facts, not 
more opinions’ (2009: 34) while Compaine 
talks of his own ‘data-mongering, stick-to-
the-facts approach’ (Compaine and Gomery, 
2000: 21). Concentration can be pinpointed 
not through a vague sense that one com-
pany seems to be dominant but through the 
systematic use of economic analysis, most 
often using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(HHI) which assesses market competition in 
a particular sector and quantifies the results. 
An HHI score of 1,800 or above describes 
a sector with high levels of concentration 
while a score of 1,000 or below suggests a 
relatively unconcentrated sector. The FCC, in 
its desire to relax ownership rules in 2003, 
employed this approach when establishing a 
‘Diversity Index’ that measured the degree of 
concentration in a typical market, ‘Anytown 
USA’, which was found, most conveniently, 
to have a score of exactly 738 – well below 
warning levels.
Noam, in his 500-page survey of the own-
ership of contemporary US communications 
industries, presents data in order to negoti-
ate between what he sees as two opposing, 
and flawed, hypotheses: first, the ‘destined 
to diversity’ scenario in which digital tech-
nologies are ushering in a communications 
cornucopia, and second, the ‘doomed to con-
centration’ scenario (2009: 34) in which the 
media environment will inevitably be reduced 
to a small handful of all-powerful fiefdoms. 
Instead, he argues that what we find is a 
media structure governed by three trends – 
growth in economies of scale, the lowering 
of entry barriers and digital convergence – 
that will see it split into large ‘integrator’ 
firms who dominate conception and distribu-
tion and a whole slew of specialist compa-
nies which cluster around them (2009: 39). 
Noam concludes, after presenting a truly 
enormous amount of data, that while broad-
cast  concentration – and more specifically 
multichannel concentration – is increasing, 
it is still well below levels ‘that would nor-
mally raise antitrust action if encountered in 
other industries’ (2009: 423). Compaine and 
Gomery, whose book is of a similar size and 
scope, are even more optimistic. Their analy-
sis of the data leads them to conclude that the 
emerging media marketplace ‘may be noted 
more for information overload and fragmen-
tation than for concentration and scarcity’ 
(2000: 578).
It is not just pro-market scholars who turn 
to data to make their arguments. Figures 
like Bagdikian (1990[1983]), Herman 
and Chomsky (1988) and Herman and 
McChesney (1997) all provide statistical evi-
dence to support claims of increased media 
concentration and commercialism. Indeed, 
Robert McChesney, one of the founders 
of the Free Press media reform group, has 
repeatedly called for economists and legal 
scholars to furnish the reform movement 
with evidence that can be presented to poli-
cymakers to substantiate the allegations of 
a link, for example, between increased con-
centration and reduced diversity. In his book, 
Communication Revolution, he writes that 
‘the movement grasped how important it was 
to have first-rate credible media research’ and 
noted that there was a pressing need ‘for tra-
ditional quantitative communication schol-
ars, for economists, and for legal scholars. 
And these scholars needed to work with us so 
that they didn’t get swallowed up by baseless 
presuppositions’ (2007: 172). Economists 
like Chang (2011), Gentzkow and Shapiro 
(2006) and Waldfogel (2007) have certainly 
taken up this challenge.
Quantitative data, therefore, is very much 
in fashion in the analysis of media owner-
ship and in the discussions that guide poli-
cymakers and regulators in responding to any 
problems that may arise from concentrated 
ownership or market failure. It is the ‘gold 
standard by which policy judgments are made’ 
(Napoli and Karaganis, 2007: 56) and is at the 
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heart of the ‘evidence-based approach’ of the 
FCC and the British communications regu-
lator Ofcom, both of which rely heavily on 
consumer research, market data, investment 
reports and econometric analyses. Indeed, 
Ofcom’s annual Communications Market 
reports are probably the most valuable source 
of data for any analyst of the British media.
There are two problems, however, with 
this fetishization of what has come to be 
known as ‘media metrics’, described by pro-
liberalization campaigners as ‘objective mea-
sures in contrast to subjective barometers’ 
(Thierer and Eskelsen, 2008: 9). First there 
is the fact that such data is far more likely 
to be demanded of or supplied by commer-
cial organizations. According to Napoli and 
Karaganis (2007) in their persuasive call for 
a ‘federal data agenda for communications 
policymaking’, policymakers tend to draw 
their data from a narrow range of elite 
sources. ‘Today, communication policymak-
ers rely heavily on the datasets developed by 
commercial data providers for their clients 
and the investment community, and, there-
fore, neglect their own substantial data collec-
tion capabilities and responsibilities’ (2007: 
56). Second, while a data-driven approach is 
designed theoretically to insulate media poli-
cymaking and regulatory domains from parti-
sanship and bias, there is little to suggest that 
a call to ‘objectivity’ will necessarily under-
mine the use of selective facts and subjective 
judgments. Countervailing ideas can just as 
easily be marginalized, ignored or buried, as 
happened when FCC officials refused to dis-
tribute a piece of research that demonstrated 
a link between increased consolidation and 
decreased amount of local news (Associated 
Press, 2006). Indeed, the Diversity Index 
employed by the FCC in 2003 to measure 
degrees of concentration in local markets 
was eventually discredited by the Appeals 
Court for relying too heavily on quantitative 
methods and for not paying enough attention 
to issues of content and the impact of differ-
ent types of speech. It seems that not every-
thing in the media environment can be easily 
quantified.
Studying oWnerShip and 
regulation aS normative 
modelS
A contrasting approach to tackling questions 
of ownership and regulation is to be found 
in the pursuit not of empirical data but of 
normative models, ‘ideal types’ of ownership 
structure or regulatory behaviour. These are 
most often expressed in terms of arrange-
ments that best facilitate democratic practice, 
for example with the liberal market concep-
tion that the media collectively should act 
as a ‘watchdog’ where its prime role is to 
‘monitor the full range of state activity, and 
fearlessly expose abuses of official authority’ 
(Curran, 2002a: 217). In this case, forms of 
media ownership and regulation are required 
that guarantee both autonomy from the state 
and free and fair competition in the alloca-
tion and distribution of resources. Similarly, 
a pluralist perspective on ownership holds 
that media should articulate the widest 
possible range of views in order to allow citi-
zens to seek out and act on all viable infor-
mation as they participate in public life. In 
both cases, rules may be necessary to break 
up unaccountable and unacceptable concen-
trations of power that distort or undermine 
the ability of media to achieve these noble 
objectives.
The legal scholar Ed Baker hints at such 
an ownership model when he provides three 
main reasons for opposing concentration. 
First, he insists that we will arrive a more 
‘democratic distribution of communicative 
power (2007: 6) with a dispersed distribu-
tion structure that allows for a breadth of 
voices and representations in order that no 
one voice is excluded. Second, he argues 
that the ‘widest possible dispersion of media 
power reduces the risk of the abuse of com-
municative power’ (2007: 16), and notes how 
the Italian premier, Silvio Berlusconi, has 
amassed significant economic and political 
power through his domination of the Italian 
media. Finally, he claims that a more egali-
tarian media structure is likely to improve 
quality and reduce the risk of market failure 
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as it will check the urge of concentrated 
organizations to put profit and shareholder 
value above all else. There are, he concludes, 
‘fundamental democratic and significant 
structural economic reasons’ (2007: 53) for 
introducing rules that will disperse media 
ownership and consolidate the democratic 
benefits of a pluralistic media system.
Indeed some of most lucid accounts of the 
relationship between a competitive media 
system and a robust democracy are to be 
found in official justifications for precisely 
these ownership rules. Consider this state-
ment by the then Conservative government 
when reviewing British media ownership 
rules back in 1995:
A free and diverse media are an indispensable part 
of the democratic process. They provide the multi-
plicity of voices and opinions that informs the 
public, influences opinion, and engenders political 
debate. They promote the culture of dissent which 
any healthy democracy must have. In so doing, they 
contribute to the cultural fabric of the nation and 
help define our sense of identity and purpose. If one 
voice becomes too powerful, this process is placed 
in jeopardy and democracy is damaged. Special 
media ownership rules, which exist in all major 
media markets, are needed therefore to provide the 
safeguards necessary to main diversity and plurality. 
(Department for National Heritage, 1995: 3)
Even the FCC in its attempt in 2003 to relax 
broadcast ownership restrictions nevertheless 
insisted on the normative importance of 
retaining measures to promote viewpoint 
diversity in the interests of democracy. 
Despite the huge implications of the advent 
of the internet and new sources of plurality, 
‘[w]e therefore continue to believe that 
broadcast ownership limits are necessary to 
preserve and promote viewpoint diversity. A 
large number of independent owners will 
tend to generate a wider array of viewpoints 
in the media than would a comparatively 
smaller number of owners’ (2003: 11). These 
views are shared by many scholars writing 
on the significance of media ownership rules, 
for example Barron (2000), Doyle (2002) 
and Overbeck (2007).
A related way in which scholars have 
approached ownership and regulation has 
been to identify the normative bases of tradi-
tional public policy approaches to these ques-
tions. Philip Napoli, for example, talks of the 
‘enduring normative principles’ (2001: 21) 
that underlie communications policymaking: 
concepts such as localism, diversity, universal 
service, competition and the public interest. 
McQuail (1992, 68–77) discusses freedom, 
equality and social order as mobilizing prin-
ciples for attempts to regulate media systems, 
while Tom Gibbons highlights values such as 
free speech, independence and accountability 
(1998: 35–54). We could add to these lists a 
whole host of other normative commitments – 
to pluralism, citizenship, welfare and social 
justice as well as to efficiency, productivity 
and profitability – and assess the ways in 
which different ownership structures and 
arrangements impact on these commitments.
Other scholars are keen to enshrine these 
kinds of normative principles in actual 
designs for democratic media practices. 
Georgina Born, for example, develops a ‘nor-
mative architecture’ (2006: 116) in which a 
range of communicative conversations may 
be fostered by the peculiar possibilities of a 
public service, non-profit broadcaster. The 
ability to stimulate these different dialogues is 
related not just to questions of ownership but 
to the characteristics of particular platforms 
(whether terrestrial television or the internet) 
in establishing ‘dialogical flows between the 
sociocultural majority and minorities, or dom-
inant and subordinate groups (2006: 116). 
James Curran has devised a ‘working model’ 
(2002a: 240) of a democratic media system 
that is stratified by different forms of own-
ership. At the core of his system, is a public 
service broadcaster responsible, above all, to 
its viewers and listeners (like, Curran argues, 
public service channels in Germany and 
Scandinavia with their broadcasting councils 
and democratic representation). This core 
is surrounded by four ‘peripheral’ media 
sectors – civic, professional, social market 
and private spaces – which, taken together, 
will guarantee not only the communicative 
rights of minorities but ‘act as a restraint on 
the over-entrenchment of minority concerns 
BK-SAGE-ALVARADO_ETAL-140444-Chp01.indd   8 9/19/2014   12:57:51 PM
HOW TO STUDY OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 9
to the exclusion of majority pleasures’ (2002a: 
241). While this is a distinctively European-
looking project, William Hoynes has 
sketched out a vision for public broadcast-
ing in the US which requires re-thinking the 
‘core mission of public broadcasting in the 
digital age’ (2007: 375; see also Center for 
Social Media, 2009). Hoynes suggests that 
public broadcasting should adopt a remit that 
clearly distinguishes itself from commercial 
broadcasting and instead focuses on local 
programming as well as independent news 
and current affairs.
A focus on the normative and conceptual 
is valuable in allowing us to imagine demo-
cratic ownership structures and regulatory 
practices (or to criticize structures and prac-
tices that are not) from the point of view of 
firmly-held values and perspectives. There 
is little doubt, for example, that the media 
reform legislation passed in Argentina in 
2009 and finally validated by the courts in 
2013 – which, in its commitment to diver-
sify the airwaves by assigning one-third of 
licenses each to community organizations, 
state broadcasters and private companies’ 
(Reporters without Borders, 2013), is strik-
ingly similar to Curran’s model outlined 
above – was partly informed by a vision of 
what a democratic media system should look 
like. There is, however, always a danger that 
by choosing not to focus on empirical data, 
some normative accounts lack verifiability, 
or more precisely, relevance to particular 
political and economic contexts. Of course, 
there is no reason why normative accounts 
should be counterposed to empirically-based 
studies, and, indeed, many of the texts quoted 
above combine normative reflections with 
at least some detail about specific media 
environments. Georgina Born best expresses 
this approach in her anthropological analysis 
of a changing BBC (Born, 2004), and later 
concludes that scholars:
need to break down the boundaries between nor-
mative theories and the design of democratic insti-
tutions, including media systems suited to 
democratic pluralism. From a policy perspective, we 
need to take political philosophies seriously – to 
realize that they offer tangible bases on which to 
construct institutional arrangements; but also to 
acknowledge that our existing institutions embody 
political philosophies that themselves deserve scru-
tiny and updating. (2006: 119)
Studying oWnerShip and 
regulation aS ideological 
proceSSeS
This leads us to a third way of studying 
ownership and regulation: not as the mere 
embodiment of quantitative data nor as the 
receptacle of theoretically sophisticated nor-
mative positions, but as systems of thought 
and action that are related to specific ways of 
ordering the world. From this perspective, 
attitudes towards conglomeration or compe-
tition, for example, are revealing for the 
wider ideological positions that they point to 
(for example, about the market as an enabler 
of productive symbolic activity); the advo-
cacy of particular regulatory mechanisms 
and objectives is far from a simple technical 
or administrative matter, but is connected to 
values and priorities that are by no means 
natural or inevitable. This is an approach 
adopted by a whole number of critical com-
munication scholars who identify forms of 
media ownership and regulation as central 
devices for securing consent to ‘market-driven 
politics’ (Leys, 2001). For Ben Bagdikian, 
whose book The Media Monopoly (1990 
[1983]) was one of the first to combine data on 
media concentration with a sociological analy-
sis of media influence, ownership is a mecha-
nism for managing the exclusion of certain 
voices from political power. Media ownership, 
he argues, is connected to the ability ‘to treat 
some subjects briefly and obscurely but others 
repetitively and in depth’, a seemingly ‘normal 
and necessary’ (1990 [1983]: 16) journalistic 
practice that skews public opinion in the inter-
est of powerful corporations.
Many other figures have followed in 
Bagdikian’s footsteps, updating and refining 
his initial arguments in the face of sustained 
pressure from critics (such as Compaine and 
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Gomery, 2000 and Thierer, 2005). In the 
field of media ownership, notable contribu-
tions include Herman and Chomsky (1988) 
and their development of a ‘propaganda 
model’ in which concentrated ownership 
plays a significant role, as well as the work of 
Robert McChesney (1999, 2004) who argues 
that struggles over media ownership have 
long been battles over the soul of American 
democracy. With reference to media policy-
making and regulation, there is a rich seam of 
literature that explores the ideological basis 
of policy and regulatory decisions that serve 
to naturalize capitalist property relations and 
systems of thought, including Aufderheide 
(1999), Braman (2007), Freedman (2008), 
Horwitz (1989), Schiller (1999) and, perhaps 
most persuasively, Streeter (1996), who 
argues that policymaking is an ideological 
means of resolving differences and enforcing 
order in the communications environment 
and beyond: ‘underlying all the (very real) 
disagreements and debates is a relatively 
constant structure of expectations that limit 
discussion, not by coercion, but by way of the 
subtle but profound power of interpretation’ 
(1996: 117). The rest of this chapter seeks to 
highlight this interpretive activity by calling 
for an analytical emphasis on agency and a 
recognition of the significance of interests  
in three particular ways: by treating media 
ownership and regulation as subjects for 
debate (rather than as a given); by examining 
dominant arguments in ownership and regula-
tory debates; and, finally, by focusing concep-
tually on processes of inaction and silence at 
the heart of these debates.
highlight oWnerShip and 
regulation aS topicS for deBate
The classroom debate has long been one of 
the most popular ways of clarifying complex 
issues: organize students into different groups, 
ask them to propose contrasting arguments 
and to marshal the appropriate evidence, and 
then assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
all sides. Applied to media ownership and 
regulation, this approach can be extremely 
useful in that it refuses to take established 
starting positions – for example about the 
desirability or undesirability of regulation – 
for granted. When Rupert Murdoch 
announced to the Federal Trade Commission 
that ‘the government needs to clear the path 
for companies to invest and innovate – by 
reducing unnecessary regulation and elimi-
nating obstacles to growth and investment’ 
(Murdoch, 2009), we should treat this both as 
a claim that needs substantiating as well as an 
expression of a particular, neo-liberal world 
view. Similarly, when Robert McChesney 
challenges the idea that we are witnessing a 
period of deregulation and that instead we are 
seeing ‘government regulation that advances 
the interests of the dominant corporate players’ 
(2004: 19–20), we should check the evidence 
and consider this statement in relation to his 
commitment to a form of radical democracy. 
Indeed, we should investigate both claims 
side by side in order to achieve a grounded 
understanding of contemporary arguments 
concerning regulation.
A stimulating debate along these lines was 
hosted by the openDemocracy website (www.
opendemocracy.net/) where, broadly speak-
ing, three positions were set out in relation 
to the question of media ownership: that we 
are seeing decreasing levels of concentration 
that pose no threat to media pluralism and 
diversity; that we are seeing increasing levels 
of concentration that represent a disturbing 
trend; and that a focus on levels of concentra-
tion is unwarranted and insufficient to explain 
the dynamics of the contemporary media.
The first position was most forcefully put 
by Ben Compaine (2001) and David Elstein 
(2002) who argued that, given the impact of 
new technologies and the increased number of 
media sources and outlets, ownership is becom-
ing more dispersed, control of media markets 
more fragile and the dangers of oligopoly 
more distant. Compaine presents evidence 
(2001: 2) that the influence of the fifty largest 
media corporations in the US increased only 
fractionally from 1986 to 1997 and that while 
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some sectors are more concentrated, particu-
larly those like daily newspapers that are in 
decline, the general picture is of more choice 
and more competition. Compaine also argues 
that media ownership is generally ‘extremely 
democratic’ (2001: 4) because of the ability 
of shareholders to apply pressure on man-
agement and that, while not perfect, existing 
patterns of ownership provide audiences with 
more than a reasonable amount of diversity 
and quality. Elstein, a former head of pro-
gramming at BSkyB, concurs with this view 
that the market has facilitated choice and 
quality and that the idea of omnipotent media 
moguls seriously underestimates the extent 
to which these entrepreneurs face uncertain 
technological futures, regulatory impediments 
and high-risk investments. ‘The global media 
game’ he concludes ‘is far more complex than 
a simple David and Goliath story’ (2002: 7).
These arguments were rebutted by commen-
tators who argued that the expanding market 
power of a handful of transnational media 
corporations (for example Time Warner, 
Disney, Sony, Viacom and News Corporation) 
distorts competition, undermines independent 
journalism and restricts diversity. According 
to Robert McChesney, the growth of these 
media conglomerates that have cross-media 
interests in the world’s largest media markets 
has led to a situation in which these ‘giants do 
compete ferociously, but they do so under the 
rules of oligopolistic markets, meaning they 
have far greater control over their fate than 
those in truly competitive markets’ (2001: 1). 
This concentration of economic and symbolic 
power is disastrous for democracy, not simply 
because it restricts the number and variety 
of information sources but also because it 
provides unaccountable media owners with 
extensive political influence. Witness (once 
again) the rise of former Italian prime min-
ister Silvio Berlusconi who would not have 
reached that position ‘if he did not dominate 
a massive media empire that enabled him 
to manufacture a political party’ (Curran, 
2002b: 3). Curran also argues that, contra 
Compaine’s claim (2001, 4) that media busi-
nesses tend ‘to be run not to promote an 
ideology but to seek profit’, media concen-
tration is likely to promote the dissemination 
of ‘conservative or market-friendly positions, 
but more rarely their antithesis’ (Curran, 
2002b: 3). McChesney (2002) illustrates this 
point with reference to the generally com-
pliant press coverage in the US of the deci-
sion to go war in Iraq, the Enron scandal and 
the 2000 presidential election, all of which 
privileged official sources and lacked criti-
cal perspectives and non-routine voices. The 
logic of McChesney and Curran’s arguments 
is that restrictions on media ownership are 
therefore necessary to curb concentrated 
media power and to foster a more open and 
genuinely competitive environment.
David Hesmondhalgh (2001) provides 
a critique of both sets of arguments and an 
alternative focus to one on ownership. Whilst 
accusing Compaine of neglecting the negative 
consequences of media conglomeration and 
marketization, he also criticizes McChesney 
for painting an ‘inaccurate and unrecogniz-
able picture of complete corporate control 
and uniform output’ (McChesney, 2001). 
Instead, Hesmondhalgh argues that media 
producers enjoy sufficient autonomy allow-
ing them not to follow meekly or consistently 
the dictates of owners and executives and that 
even following a ratings-led perspective is 
likely to enable the production of challenging 
and alternative forms of content just as it is 
also likely to lead to the emergence of trivial 
and sensationalized material. An emphasis 
on ownership alone fosters an instrumentalist 
approach (on both sides of the argument) that 
marginalizes more difficult questions concern-
ing the management of ‘risk and uncertainty 
within the media business’ (Hesmondhalgh, 
2001). The unpredictability of audiences and 
the high degree of failure means that a cer-
tain amount of innovation and creativity is 
built into media production in such a way that 
media content cannot be reduced to questions 
of ownership alone. Furthermore, the empha-
sis on news and current affairs in the debates 
on ownership misses out on the role of other 
formats and genres and diminishes the impor-
tance of popular culture. Finally, the fact that 
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there is ‘no necessary link between oligop-
oly and reduced diversity’ (Hesmondhalgh, 
2001) – witness the explosion of niche 
musics presided over by both large and small 
 corporations – suggests to Hesmondhalgh 
that ‘there are other factors, besides owner-
ship, at work in explaining media output’ 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2001).
Hesmondhalgh makes some valuable points 
about the contradictions of media power but 
his insistence that we need to move on from 
a focus on ownership is more problematic. 
Firstly, as we shall see later, this is a view 
shared by proponents of ownership liberaliza-
tion who wish to de-prioritize concentration 
as a controversial issue. Indeed Compaine is 
quite happy to use Silvio Waisbord’s nuanced 
argument, that despite unwelcome concentra-
tion there remain political opportunities and 
‘spaces for conflict and change’ (Waisbord, 
2002: 1), as evidence of the innate dynamism 
and diversity of media markets. Secondly, it 
is not the case that those who harp on about 
ownership claim that it explains everything 
about media performance. McChesney (2004: 
208), for example, repeatedly points out that 
there are many factors that shape media out-
put apart from ownership but he argues nev-
ertheless that a public policy emphasis on 
stimulating competition within media mar-
kets by curbing excessive concentration is 
needed precisely in order to facilitate diverse, 
creative, unexpected and antagonistic content. 
Thirdly, for all those interested in an indepen-
dent, critical and relevant media system, is 
it the right time to move on from an interest 
in ownership, particularly when the relax-
ation of media ownership rules continue to 
be debated by policymakers and regulators in 
both Britain and the US?
The lively debate hosted by openDemoc-
racy is a productive way of engaging with 
foundational propositions concerning media 
ownership. It reminds us that ownership mat-
ters not only because of the largely unac-
countable political and economic power that 
accrues to those individuals and corporations 
with extensive media interests, and not only 
because they are able to deploy their market 
power to act as influential cultural gatekeep-
ers, but also because administrations and regu-
lators in the UK and US have been particularly 
absorbed with trying to relax media ownership 
regulations over the last ten years. If media 
ownership is only a peripheral influence on 
media content, why are politicians, policy-
makers and media moguls so preoccupied 
with it? Debating what are often presented as 
fixed positions is both a stimulating and an 
analytically rewarding way of reflecting on 
approaches to ownership and regulation.
examine moBilizing argumentS
As well as treating ownership and regulation as 
subjects for debate, we should interrogate very 
carefully the arguments of elite actors 
in the contexts in which they are proposed. 
This involves focusing on those documents 
and processes where arguments are most 
forcefully mobilized: in corporations’ annual 
reports, parliamentary transcripts, submissions 
to consultations and reviews, contributions to 
regulator or industry panels, evidence to inquir-
ies and so on. Of course, not all information is 
made public and the often subterranean con-
nections between lobbyists and government, 
in particular, make it difficult to identify all 
relevant and influential interventions (see 
Freedman, 2008: 93). It is, nevertheless, worth 
highlighting the claims of key participants 
involved in specific ownership-related issues 
and this next section focuses on four of the 
most significant justifications articulated by 
advocates of liberalization in their campaigns 
to scale back broadcast ownership regulations.
The most common argument is technologi-
cal: that in a brave new world of digital devel-
opments and consumer choice, there is little 
need to worry about oligopoly or a lack of 
diversity. The dizzying speed of technological 
innovation and market adaptation make redun-
dant most attempts to control artificially the 
structure of markets or the preferences of con-
sumers. This is especially true for television 
where spectrum scarcity, the phenomenon 
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that provided the historic justification for reg-
ulating broadcasting, has been largely abol-
ished in the digital age of virtually limitless 
bandwidth. ‘Given the overwhelming wealth 
of both broadcast and non-broadcast media 
options available to consumers today’, argued 
some of the largest entertainment companies 
in the US back in 2003, ‘the factual under-
pinnings of the spectrum scarcity rationale of 
broadcast regulation … no longer are valid (if 
they ever were)’ (Joint Commenters, 2003: v).
Referring to the communication ‘abun-
dance’ specifically facilitated by the internet, 
former FCC chair Michael Powell (2003) 
argued that:
the most striking difference between the world 
today and the world pre-remote [control] is that 
Americans now have access to a bottomless well 
of information called the Internet … The time has 
come to honestly and fairly examine the facts of 
the modern marketplace and build rules that 
reflect the digital world we live in today, not the 
bygone era of black-and-white television.
Adam Thierer, an influential Washington 
think tank analyst and firm supporter of own-
ership liberalization, echoes this approach 
when arguing that we are currently living in 
a ‘golden age’ of media.
There has never been a time in our nation’s history 
when the citizens had access to more media out-
lets, more news and information, or more enter-
tainment. Abundance, not scarcity, is the defining 
fact of our current media age… the question of 
who owns what, or how much they own is utterly 
irrelevant (Thierer, 2005: 161).
In the most recent FCC proceedings on 
media ownership, the general counsel for the 
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) 
attacked the ‘asymmetric regulation of broad-
cast outlets in comparison to their [cable and 
online] competitors’ and called for the ‘mod-
ernization of out-of-date restrictions that do 
not reflect current competitive realities in the 
Internet age’ (Mago, 2009: 8).
Essentially, the argument is that the internet 
has stolen audiences, attention and advertising 
away from television in particular and that, 
therefore, the ‘rules of the game’ have changed 
forever. BSkyB’s senior legal adviser, for 
example, argues that British regulators have 
‘played down the significant increase in the 
use of the internet as a main source of news’ 
(Austin, 2009) in their decision not to scrap 
national media ownership rules. Ken Ferree, 
formerly head of the FCC’s Media Bureau 
and then a fellow at the now-defunct Progress 
and Freedom Foundation, declared to a 2009 
ownership hearing that ‘there can be no deny-
ing that radio and television broadcast is a 
much less significant part of the media uni-
verse than they once were’ (Ferree, 2009: 1), 
leading him to ask one simple question: ‘are 
these ownership rules even relevant in today’s 
media marketplace?’ (Ferree, 2009: 1).
Liberalization is also justified on eco-
nomic grounds: that the profitability of media 
businesses would be enhanced through the 
relaxation of ownership rules. This was 
most crudely put by Viacom president Mel 
Karmazin who noted that a wave of deregula-
tion followed the Gulf War in 1991 and there-
fore argued for further ownership rule changes 
to compensate broadcasters for losses suffered 
after 9/11. ‘We believe acquisition oppor-
tunities could present themselves’, he said. 
‘There are a lot of very leveraged companies 
out there. If there is a silver lining in all of 
this, it could be that some of our competition 
is not as strong’ (quoted in Freedman, 2003: 
297). According to Bob Okun, a lobbyist for 
NBC, the economic climate for broadcasters 
‘only got worse after Sept, 11. As we look to 
2002, it certainly makes sense to re-examine 
any and all regulations that continue to hinder 
broadcasters’ ability to grow and survive an 
increasingly difficult marketplace’ (quoted in 
McClintock, 2001).
Reviews of media ownership rules are fre-
quently dominated by claims by ‘old media’ 
companies that by continuing with existing 
prohibitions on ownership, traditional media 
businesses will be at a disadvantage in the new 
digital environment This argument was made 
with particular vigour by CBS in the 2006 own-
ership review, warning that without the ability 
to manoeuvre freely in the marketplace, ‘we 
put at risk the rich American tradition of free, 
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over-the-air broadcasting, including its univer-
sal availability, commitment to public service 
and localism, and its high quality entertain-
ment, sports and news programming’ (CBS, 
2006: 3). Many other US broadcast interests, 
particularly those representing smaller station 
owners, have made the same point: that liber-
alization is increasingly necessary to maintain 
‘economic viability in a market dominated by 
consolidated multichannel providers and other 
competitors’ (NAB, 2006: iv). The director 
of Heart Television put it this way: ‘By con-
solidating ownership, operational and techno-
logical resources, local television stations can 
achieve new economic efficiencies and will be 
able to compete more effectively in the digital 
era’ (Barrett, 2009: 4). The British communi-
cations regulator also agrees that consolidation 
will allow companies to realize economies of 
scale and scope, to recruit the best managers 
and provide them with better access to over-
seas capital (Ofcom, 2006: 7).
A third source of pressure to change exist-
ing ownership rules is the increasingly fierce 
interrogation by media businesses and regula-
tors of the link between plurality of owner-
ship and diversity of viewpoint, a connection 
that is at the heart of democratic accounts of 
media policy but dismissed by the NAB as 
‘unproven’ (2006: 42). Ofcom too notes that 
‘[o]wnership plurality does not necessarily 
ensure editorial or viewpoint diversity’ (2006: 
6, emphasis in original) and suggests that ‘it 
may also be the case that different sources of 
news offer the same perspective’ (2006: 6). 
According to this logic, the best guarantee of 
diversity is not statutory restrictions on own-
ership but an environment in which the mar-
ket is allowed to operate as freely as possible 
and in which competing viewpoints will be 
publicized as a result of consumer sovereignty 
and not regulatory intervention.
This links to a fourth justification for liber-
alization: a belief that regulation is likely only 
to constrain the innate creativity unleashed by 
market forces. This reflects a neo-liberal con-
ception that the state should have only a lim-
ited role in directing productive activity, that 
innovation is best realized when left to its own 
devices and that restrictions on media own-
ership are, ultimately, a violation of speech 
rights. ‘My notion of the First Amendment’, 
wrote Shaun Sheehan, chief lobbyist for the 
giant Tribune media corporation, in a letter to 
William Safire, the New York Times columnist 
and supporter of ownership rules,
is that the framers feared excesses of government 
and that the press would be the countervailing force, 
the unfettered watchdog. Without scale and with 
the White House gunning for its broadcast licences, 
could the Washington Post have pursued Watergate? 
The New York Times, the Pentagon Papers? The 
more we get back to ‘Congress shall make no laws’ 
the better we will be. (Sheehan, 2003)
Ownership rules, according to this rhetoric, 
conflict with basic First Amendment rights to 
freedom of expression and should be mini-
mized in order to protect the speech rights of 
corporations. Market forces, according to this 
perspective, are not only not inimical to plu-
ralist goals of source and viewpoint diversity 
but are increasingly the main guarantors of 
such aspirations.
Identifying the key arguments posed by 
pro-liberalization voices is a fantastic way 
not simply of bringing to life what can be 
rather dry debates on ownership but also of 
helping to know where to start in challenging 
these perspectives. Opponents of concentra-
tion can point to the strong strand of tech-
nological determinism that exaggerates the 
impact of new technologies in a particularly 
one-sided way, as requiring liberalization. 
Arguments that the internet has done away 
with the need for ownership rules aimed at 
ensuring media pluralism and diversity are 
as much ideologically driven as they are the 
result of technological necessity or empirical 
accuracy (Curran et al., 2012). ‘The sceptical 
observer’, according to Jean Seaton (1998: 
123), may ‘conclude that the frequently heard 
claim that technology “requires” this or that 
policy, is just a way of masking a vested inter-
est in the handy disguise of modernity’. Those 
interested in ownership questions can point 
to conceptual debates about the democratic 
significance of the media and use empirical 
data to reject the argument that the market, as 
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a matter of course, gives voice to divergent 
groups and perspectives (see Di Cola, 2006 
for research that points to a link between 
ownership consolidation and ‘homogenized 
programming’).
A further response to pro-liberalization 
arguments concerns their underlying assump-
tions about ownership rules themselves: that 
they constitute a ‘barrier’ to growth, a ‘shackle’ 
on investment, a ‘violation’ of free speech, and 
a ‘restraint’ of free trade. The equation of own-
ership rules with overwhelmingly negative and 
restrictive characteristics is designed to shift 
the focus away from their original intention: to 
promote a wider range of voices and perspec-
tives than would be provided by market forces 
alone. In fact, it is more than likely that in an 
internet- dominated future there will still be the 
need for special controls to promote diversity. 
Given the amount of internet traffic dominated 
by Google, YouTube and Facebook as well as 
by established media companies, a broadband 
internet future is certain to produce new types 
of monopoly and new forms of exclusion that 
can only be tackled with purposeful and posi-
tive intervention into media markets. It seems 
rather obvious that if we are still committed 
to pluralism and diversity, then there is little 
point in junking the traditional mechanisms 
for achieving these outcomes simply because 
we are faced with different technologies. 
However, in order to be able successfully 
to rebut pro-liberalization arguments, those 
opposed to further liberalization need to be 
familiar with the detail of their arguments.
focuS on inaction and Silence
At first glance, a call to focus on inaction in 
relation to the ownership and regulation of 
the television sector makes very little sense 
when you consider the hyperactivity of 
governments, civil servants, regulators and 
broadcasters around the world as they prepare 
to shift from analogue to digital television or 
to update their media ownership rules for a 
digital future. In the UK, for example, the 
previous Labour government published a 
report, Digital Britain [DB] (BIS/DCMS, 
2009) that provided the legislative framework 
for communications at a critical moment in 
the country’s digital development. DB was 
very precise in some of its recommendations: 
it sanctioned a small monthly levy on every 
fixed copper telephone line to make sure that 
the whole of the UK population had access to 
a broadband service by 2012; it further pro-
posed to set up three pilot Independently 
Funded News Consortia (IFNC) schemes by 
2012, one in Scotland, one in Wales and one 
in an English region, to deliver television 
news as a result of its acceptance that the main 
commercial channel, ITV1, will no longer be 
able to afford to produce regional bulletins. 
DB’s plans for radio involved an equally 
activist approach based on a ‘clear direction 
from Government’ (2009: 75) to move 
national FM stations over to digital broadcast-
ing (DAB) and to shift medium wave services 
to FM by 2015. Many of these schemes have 
since either been dropped or deemed to be 
‘unrealistic’ but, by any account, this is not a 
regulatory environment marked by sloth or by 
passivity, particularly given the huge number 
of reviews, consultations and ‘action plans’ 
considering, in particular, the future of broad-
band roll out, intellectual property television 
news, public service broadcasting (PSB) and 
media ownership rules.
These activities, however, all refer to overt 
acts of government, to the decision-making 
actions of policymaking bodies and to the 
consultative work of regulatory agencies – in 
other words to the public exercise of ‘official’ 
power. There is, however, an entirely differ-
ent approach, rooted in debates in social and 
political science that emerged in the 1960s (for 
example Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 
2005 [1974]) that seeks to locate power in 
less visible arenas of decision- making and 
indeed to focus instead on examples of silence 
and non-decision-making. Instead of focus-
ing exclusively on the evidence provided by 
key participants, the content of white papers 
and regulatory orders, the detail of draft bills 
and Congressional acts and the flavour of 
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parliamentary debates, this approach examines 
the means by which alternative options are 
marginalized, conflicting values de- legitimized 
and rival interests de-recognized. This flows 
from an understanding of decision-making as 
an ideological process structured by unequal 
access to power and where power itself ‘is 
at its most effective when least observable’ 
(Lukes, 2005 [1974]: 1).
It is worth noting at this point that the 
‘liberal’ narrative of non-intervention and 
the libertarian principles on which it is based 
have not disappeared in the ‘hyperactivism’ 
of recent media policy approaches. The lib-
eral demand for non-intervention is perhaps 
most purely expressed by James Murdoch, 
the deputy chief operating officer of News 
Corporation, who has called for the dissolu-
tion of all rules affecting the broadcast sector: 
‘there is a long way to go before consum-
ers enjoy the sovereignty that is their right. 
We don’t need more controls to achieve that. 
We need a bonfire of controls. Then com-
merce will be free to drive out culture forward 
to the real “golden age” of broadcasting’ 
(cited in Plunkett, 2005).
Indeed, this latter perspective, intimately 
linked to neo-liberal visions of economy and 
society that, as we have seen, privilege the 
dynamism of market forces and relegate the 
state to a secondary role, is far from absent 
in Digital Britain. The opening of DB makes 
it clear that meddling should be the exception 
and not the rule. In those cases where mar-
ket forces are adequately serving customers, 
the ‘simple position is that these sectors are 
working well and do not need commentary, 
intervention or unnecessary interference’ 
(BIS/DCMS, 2009: 9). Furthermore, the 
report argues that ‘an excessive focus on the 
sector could chill operational negotiations and 
decisions while participants wait to see how it 
all pans out’ (2009: 10). Non-intervention, in 
other words, is the safest option, generally the 
default position for neo-liberal governments 
for whom an activist public policy approach 
is only needed in those areas in which ‘mar-
ket failure’ is likely to take place, for exam-
ple the provision of a universal broadband 
infrastructure or the delivery of regional and 
local news.
Now this sounds reasonable enough at 
first glance but, of course, it begs the ques-
tion of what constitutes an example of ‘mar-
ket failure’, who decides this, what values are 
brought to bear on the decision-making pro-
cess and what other options are considered in 
achieving regulatory objectives in relation to 
this particular area? The central question then 
concerns not the rights and wrongs of inter-
vention per se (as neo-liberals claim) but the 
reasons for intervening in this area and not 
in another one. Why does a particular issue 
become a ‘problem’ that is worthy of public 
policy attention? Why does the building of a 
broadband infrastructure become an urgent 
‘problem’ for which senior government fig-
ures attempt to find a solution while the con-
centration of key sectors of media does not? 
Why is piracy such a major issue for legisla-
tors but not falling budgets for original televi-
sion programming? An exclusive emphasis on 
immediate and observable regulatory debates 
misses out on this deeper level of question-
ing: what are the presuppositions that govern 
the parameters of the regulatory process and 
that shape what questions are asked as well as 
which ones are not? Who holds definitional 
as well as organizational power inside policy-
making and regulatory networks?
This is where a focus on inaction and non-
decision-making can be highly productive 
in terms of identifying the ‘dominant values 
and the political myths, rituals and institu-
tions’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 950) that 
structure access to power in decision-making 
contexts. Such an approach would involve 
an analysis of how the policy and regula-
tory agenda is formulated and objectives are 
framed, which voices are privileged inside and 
which are frozen out of debates, how partici-
pation is invited or barriers erected, and from 
whom information (or ‘evidence’) is sought. It 
would focus on the ideological positions that 
are brought to bear in shaping agenda-setting 
questions and suggest that regulation, far from 
being a simple administrative act, is instead 
a series of highly politicized transactions in 
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which certain preferences are celebrated and 
others marginalized (Freedman, 2008).
Silence, in this context, does not mean 
‘doing nothing’ and ‘inaction’ does not sug-
gest a lack of energy on the part of policymak-
ers and regulators nor a reluctance in principle 
to intervene. Rather it refers to a strategic deci-
sion that the best way to promote hegemonic 
interests and to naturalize foundational values 
is through a particular role for the state. In 
recent years this has consisted of administra-
tions assisting, as quietly as possible, in the 
rolling out of markets and market logic in the 
media sector. In helping market forces to oper-
ate ‘freely’ and to extend their reach, public 
policy, in for example the US and UK, has 
been crucial. From decisions on what consti-
tutes an acceptable level of broadcast owner-
ship concentration to their determination to 
secure analogue switch-off, and from their 
unyielding support for domestic rights holders 
to increase market opportunities in export ven-
tures to their commitment to leverage existing 
copyright protections onto emerging distribu-
tion platforms, the British and American states 
have played a decisive role on behalf of key 
sections of their media industries. Neo-liberal 
commentators may call it ‘deregulation’ and 
present this as evidence of ‘small government’ 
but many critics (for example Humphreys, 
1996) have long described it as re-regulation 
and as proof of a complex partnership between 
the state and private industry.
This partnership is successful to the 
extent that state and private elites are able to 
legitimize their preferences and to use their 
decision-making influence pre-emptively to 
smother any challenges (and the campaign 
in 2003 against the proposed relaxation of 
ownership rules in the US shows that this is 
not a foregone conclusion). Silence, in this 
context, refers to the options that are not con-
sidered, to the questions that are kept off the 
policy and regulatory agendas, to the players 
who are not invited to the bargaining table, 
and to the values that are seen as unrealistic 
or undesirable by those best able to mobilize 
their decision-making power. For example, in 
current discussions concerning the allocation 
of spectrum released by digital switchover, 
why is it that principles of remuneration dom-
inate and why is it that the idea of handing 
spectrum to community and public bodies is 
virtually ignored? When it comes to the future 
of news, why is it that the idea of introduc-
ing some sort of public subsidy is anathema 
to policymakers, ignoring the simple fact that 
news production has long been subsidized in 
different ways by the state?
There are many other revealing absences in 
the policy approach articulated by initiatives 
like Digital Britain. Why does it assume that it 
is only the private sector that should take a lead 
in ‘delivering the effective modern commu-
nications infrastructure we need’ (BIS/DCMS, 
2009: 1)? Where is the research that shows a 
demand for making existing radio sets redun-
dant as part of the move to DAB? Why is there 
no mention at all of the possibility of industry 
levies on pay TV operators and mobile phone 
providers to fund regional television news (as 
proposed by Barwise, 2009 and the Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 2009)? Whose interests 
are reflected by Ed Richards, the chief executive 
of Ofcom, when he claims that an industry levy 
is unlikely ‘to be an attractive proposition in 
the middle of a recession’ (Richards, 2009): 
business leaders or ordinary viewers? Why 
does DB raise the spectre of siphoning off part 
of the television licence fee to fund public ser-
vice content but promises not to interfere with 
the profits of private companies? As the media 
economist Patrick Barwise argues (2009):
I don’t think you have to be a Marxist or a para-
noid schizophrenic to note that the dominant 
pay-TV operator is controlled by Rupert Murdoch 
and that this might, at the margin, influence politi-
cians’ willingness to introduce a levy on pay TV, 
however small and however great the benefits for 
the British public and the creative industries.
Here is a clear case of power being deployed 
inside the bargaining process not to argue 
against the introduction of industry levies but, 
far more effectively, to prevent the proposal 
ever being raised as a ‘serious’ policy option 
in the first place. It is the conception of the 
‘third face’ of power raised by Lukes (2005 
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[1974]: 1) as being especially effective pre-
cisely because of its invisibility.
All the various proceedings, inquiries, 
seminars and working parties investigating 
ownership rules together with all the docu-
ments, reports and policies that emerge from 
these investigations are likely to be significant 
for what they exclude, for the questions they 
fail to pose and for the alternatives they fail 
to consider. It is these gaps on which those 
interested in securing media pluralism and 
diversity ought to focus.
concluSion
This chapter has proposed a number of differ-
ent ways of approaching questions of media 
ownership and regulation. It has suggested 
that the interested researcher may turn to 
empirical data to substantiate particular claims 
or to justify certain policy recommendations; 
it then turned to more normative assumptions 
about ‘desirable’ forms of ownership or insti-
tutional arrangements that may best facilitate 
democratic dialogue; finally, it argued that 
researchers should consider ownership and 
regulation as systems of thought that can be 
illuminated by treating them as inspirations 
for debate that reveal particular ideological 
positions, by focusing on the specific argu-
ments used by elites to justify and naturalize 
these positions, and by revealing the lacuna 
in these positions – the assumptions and prop-
ositions that are marginalized and sometimes 
excluded from official debates.
Some readers may point to a confusion 
at the heart of this typology – that the chap-
ter is encouraging us to separate out these 
approaches: to produce data but also to draw 
on conceptual models; to focus on visible 
instances of regulatory activity or ownership 
battles but simultaneously to reflect on the 
hidden depths of the decision-making envi-
ronment; to see ownership and regulation as 
administrative affairs but also as ideological 
processes. Each of these positions may be sin-
gly justifiable but, taken together, they provide 
a much more productive method of commu-
nications research. The normative without the 
empirical tends towards the abstract while 
the empirical without the conceptual tends 
towards the tedious. By adding in the recogni-
tion that what are all too often seen as rather 
bureaucratic processes are in fact systems of 
thought and action that, in the present climate, 
mobilize market-oriented values and margin-
alize non-commercial objectives, debates con-
cerning ownership and regulation can be seen 
as crucial analytical ciphers for contemporary 
neo-liberalism.
In conclusion, this chapter has argued for 
an approach to media ownership and regula-
tion that combines a focus on structure with 
an emphasis on interests. We need to identify 
whose interests are best represented in policy 
and regulatory debates and to highlight the 
mechanisms both of the inclusion and exclusion 
of these different interests. We need to evaluate 
the dominant paradigms that mark the discus-
sion of ownership and that characterize the 
regulatory process but also to introduce alter-
native frames and new starting points. Only by 
combining the empirical with the conceptual 
and the technical with the ideological, as well 
as analysing both existing structures and agents 
of change, can we be assured of capturing the 
real significance of debates and movements 
focused on media ownership and regulation.
note
 This chapter is based in part on ‘Metrics, models 
and the meaning of media ownership’, Interna-
tional Journal of Cultural Policy, December 2012 
and on work for the author’s forthcoming The Con-
tradictions of Media Power (Bloomsbury 2014).
referenceS
Associated Press (2006) ‘FCC chair orders probe 
into why media ownership studies were 
destroyed’, 19 September. Available at: www.
foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566, 
214392,00.html
BK-SAGE-ALVARADO_ETAL-140444-Chp01.indd   18 9/19/2014   12:57:51 PM
HOW TO STUDY OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 19
Aufderheide, P. (1999) Communications Policy 
and the Public Interest. New York: Guilford.
Austin, D. (2009) Submission to Ofcom Review 
of Ownership Rules, 1 October. Available at: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/
consultations/morr/responses/Sky.pdf
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. (1962) ‘Two Faces 
of Power’, American Political Science Review, 
56(4): 947–952.
Bagdikian, B. (1990 [1983]) The Media 
Monopoly, 3rd edition. Boston: Beacon Press.
Baker, C.E. (2007) Media Ownership and 
Concentration: Why Ownership Matters. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barrett, D. (2009) Remarks to FCC Ownership 
Workshop, 4 November, FCC 09–182.
Barron, J. (2000) ‘Structural Regulation of the 
Media and the Diversity Rationale’, 52 Federal 
Communications Law Journal, 555–560.
Barwise, P. (2009) ‘New Forms of Funding for 
PSB’, speech to a seminar organized by the 
Federation of Entertainment Unions, 22 June. 
Available at: www.bectu.org.uk/filegrab/
NewFormsofFundingfor PSBbyProfessorPatrick 
BarwiseFEU22.6.09.doc?ref=310.
BIS (Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills)/DCMS (Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport) (2009) Digital Britain: Final Report. 
Cm 7650. London: The Stationery Office.
Born, G. (2004) Uncertain Vision: Birt, Dyke 
and the Reinvention of the BBC. London: 
Secker & Warburg.
Born, G. (2006) ‘Digitising Democracy’, in J. 
Lloyd and J. Seaton (eds) What Can Be 
Done? Making the Politics and Media Better. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 102–123.
Braman, S. (2007) Change of State: Information, 
Policy, and Power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cassidy, J. (2006) ‘Murdoch’s Game: Will he 
Move Left in 2008?’, New Yorker, 16 October.
CBS (2006) Comments of CBS Corporation in 
the matter of the 2006 Quadrennial Review, 
FCC 06–121, 23 October.
Center for Social Media (2009) Public Media 
2.0: Dynamic, Engaged Publics. Washington 
DC: Center for Social Media.
Chang, H-J. (2011) 23 Things They Don’t Tell 
You About Capitalism. London: Penguin.
Compaine, B. (2001) ‘The Myths of Encroaching 
Global Media Ownership’, openDemocracy, 
6 November. Available at: www.opendemo-
cracy.net/media-globalmediaownership/ 
article_87.jsp
Compaine, B. and Gomery, D. (2000 [1979]) 
Who Owns the Media? Competition and 
Concentration in the Mass Media Industry, 
3rd edition. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Creech, K. (2007) Electronic Media Law and 
Regulation, 5th edition. Burlington, MA: 
Focal Press.
Curran, J. (2002a) Media and Power. London: 
Routledge.
Curran, J. (2002b) ‘Global Media Concentration: 
Shifting the Argument’, openDemocracy, 
22 May. Available at: www.opendemocracy.
n e t / m e d i a - g l o b a l m e d i a o w n e r s h i p / 
article_37.jsp
Curran, J., Fenton, N. and Freedman, D. (2012) 
Misunderstanding the Internet. London: 
Routledge.
Department for National Heritage (1995) Media 
Ownership: The Government’s Proposals, 
white paper, CM 2872. London: HMSO.
Di Cola, P. (2006) False Premises, False Promises: 
A Quantitative History of Ownership 
Consolidation in the Radio Industry. 
Washington DC: Future of Music Coalition.
Doyle, G. (2002) Media Ownership. London: 
Sage.
Eggerton, J. (2008) ‘Barack Obama’s Media 
Agenda: An Exclusive Interview’, Broadcasting 
& Cable, 16 June. Available at: http://www.
broadcastingcable.com/news/programming/
barack-obama’s-media-agenda-exclusive-
interview/28375
Elstein, D. (2002) ‘Stumbling Goliaths, Dithering 
Davids: Unpicking the Mythology of the 
Media Mogul’, openDemocracy, 27 February. 
Available at: www.opendemocracy.net/
media-globalmediaownership/article_124.jsp
FCC (2003) Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 2 June, FCC 03-127. 
Available at: https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-03-127A1.pdf
Ferree, K. (2009) Remarks to FCC Ownership 
Workshop, 4 November. Available at: http://
transition.fcc.gov/ownership/workshop- 
110309/ferree.pdf
Freedman, D. (2003) ‘Cultural Policy-Making in 
the Free Trade Era: An Evaluation of the 
Impact of Current World Trade Organization 
Negotiations on Audio-Visual Industries, 
International Journal of Cultural Policy, 9(3): 
285–298.
Freedman, D. (2008) The Politics of Media 
Policy. Cambridge: Polity.
BK-SAGE-ALVARADO_ETAL-140444-Chp01.indd   19 9/19/2014   12:57:51 PM
THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF TELEVISION STUDIES20
Gentzkow, M. and Shapiro, J. (2006) ‘Media Bias 
and Reputation’, Journal of Political Economy, 
114(2): 280–316.
Gibbons, T. (1998) Regulating the Media. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell.
Hart, K. (2009) ‘Comcast-NBC deal finds cam-
paign cash converging with Obama’s princi-
ples’, The Hill, 5 December.
Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (1988) 
Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media. New York: 
Pantheon Books.
Herman, E. and McChesney, R. (1997) The 
Global Media: The New Missionaries of 
Corporate Capitalism. London: Cassell.
Hesmondhalgh, D. (2001) ‘Ownership is Only 
Part of the Picture’, openDemocracy, 28 
November. Available at: www.opendemoc-
racy.net/media-globalmediaownership/ 
article_46.jsp
Horwitz, R. (1989) The Irony of Regulatory 
Reform: The Deregulation of American 
Telecommunications. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Hoynes, W. (2007) ‘Public Broadcasting for the 
21st Century: Notes on an Agenda for 
Reform’, Critical Studies in Media 
Communication, 24(4): 370–376.
Humphreys, P. (1996) Mass Media and Media 
Policy in Western Europe. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press.
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) (2009) 
Mind the Funding Gap: The Potential of 
Industry Levies for Continued Funding of 
Public Service Broadcasting. London: IPPR.
Joint Commenters (2003) Comments of Fox, 
NBC and Viacom in the matter of the 2002 
Biennial Regulatory Review, 02–277, 2 January.
Kelly, M., Mazzoleni, G. and McQuail, D. (eds) 
(2004) The Media in Europe: The Euromedia 
Handbook. London: Sage.
Lazarsfeld, P. and Merton, R. (2004 [1948]) 
‘Mass Communication, Popular Taste and 
Organized Social Action’, in J.D. Peters and 
P. Simonson (eds) Mass Communication and 
American Social Thought: Key Texts, 1919–
1968. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
230–242.
Leys, C. (2001) Market-Driven Politics: 
Neoliberal Democracy and the Public Interest. 
London: Verso.
Lukes, S. (2005 [1974]) Power: A Radical View, 
2nd edition. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Mago, J. (2009) Remarks to FCC Ownership 
Workshop, 4 November, FCC 09–182.
McChesney, R. (1999) Rich Media, Poor 
Democracy. New York: The New Press.
McChesney, R. (2001) ‘Policing the Thinkable’, 
openDemocracy, 23 October. Available at: 
www.opendemocracy.net/media- global 
media ownership/article_56.jsp
McChesney, R. (2002) ‘It’s a wrap? Why media 
matters to democracy’,openDemocracy, 9 
May. Available at: https://www.opendemo-
cracy.net/democracy-globalmediaownership/
article_61.jsp
McChesney, R. (2004) The Problem of the 
Media. New York: Monthly Review Press.
McChesney, R. (2007) Communication 
Revolution. New York: The New Press.
McClintock, P. (2001) ‘Nets See Regs as Best 
Relief’, Variety.com, 14 October. Available at 
www.variety.com/article/VR1117854257.
html?categoryid=14&cs=1
McQuail, D. (1992) Media Performance. 
London: Sage.
Murdoch, R. (2009) ‘The Future of Journalism 
is More Promising Than Ever’, speech to the 
Federal Trade Commission, 3 December. 
Available at: http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/
node/44737
NAB (National Association of Broadcasters) 
(2006) Comments of the NAB in the matter 
of the 2006 Quadrennial Review, FCC 
06–121, 23 October.
Napoli, P. (2001) Foundations of Communications 
Policy. Cresskill: Hampton Press.
Napoli, P.M. and Karaganis, J. (2007) ‘Toward a 
Federal Data Agenda for Communications 
Policymaking’, CommLaw Conspectus, 16: 
53–96.
Noam, E. (2009) Media Ownership and 
Concentration in America. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Obama, B. (2008) ‘Barack Obama: Connecting 
and Empowering All Americans Through 
Technology and Innovation’, campaign fact 
sheet. Available at: http://www.wired.com/
images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/04/obamat-
echplan.pdf
Ofcom (2006) Review of Media Ownership 
Rules, 14 November. London: Ofcom.
Ofcom (2009a) ‘Consumers Prefer 
Communications Over Celebrations in 
Recession: People Taking Control and Getting 
Good Deals in Downturn’, News release, 
BK-SAGE-ALVARADO_ETAL-140444-Chp01.indd   20 9/19/2014   12:57:51 PM
HOW TO STUDY OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 21
6 August. Available at: http://media.ofcom.
org.uk/news/2009/consumers-prefer- 
communications-over-celebrations-in-reces-
sion-people-taking-control-and-getting-
good-deals-in-downturn/
Ofcom (2009b) Communications Market 
Report 2009. London: Ofcom.
Open Society Institute (2005) Television across 
Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence. 
Budapest: OSI.
Overbeck, W. (2007) Major Principles of Media 
Law, 18th edition. Belmont, CA: Thomson 
Wadsworth.
Plunkett, J. (2005) ‘Murdoch calls for “bonfire” 
of media regulations’, Guardian, 22 September. 
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/
media/2005/sep/22/broadcasting.bskyb2
Powell, M. (2003) ‘Should Limits on Broadcast 
Ownership Change?’, USA Today, 21 January.
Puttnam, D. (2006) ‘Nation of Fools’, New 
Statesman, 4 December.
Reporters without Borders (2013) ‘New broad-
cast media law is constitutional, Supreme 
Court rules’, RWB, 30 October. Available at: 
http://en.rsf.org/argentina-new-broadcast-
media-law-is-30-10-2013,45397.html
Richards, E. (2009) ‘Independently Funded 
News Consortia’, speech to the Local Media 
Summit, 28 April. Available at: http://media.
ofcom.org.uk/speeches/2009/independently-
funded-news-consortia/
Sanchez-Taberno, A. et al. (1993) Media 
Concentration in Europe. Dusseldorf: 
European Institute for the Media.
Schiller, D. (1999) Digital Capitalism: Networking 
the Global Market System. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
Seaton, J. (1998) ‘A Fresh Look at Freedom 
of Speech’, Political Quarterly, 69(b): 
117–129.
Sheehan, S. (2003) Letter to William Safire, 3 
July, private correspondence.
Streeter, T. (1996) Selling the Air: A Critique of 
the Policy of Commercial Broadcasting in the 
United States. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Thierer, A. (2005) Media Myths: Making Sense 
of the Debate over Media Ownership. 
Washington, DC: Progress and Freedom 
Foundation.
Thierer, A. and Eskelsen, G. (2008) Media 
Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media 
Marketplace. Available at: SSRN: www.ssrn.
com/abstract=1161312
Waisbord, S. (2002) ‘Media Concentration in 
Latin America’, openDemocracy, 27 February. 
Available at: www.opendemocracy.net/
media-globalmediaownership/article_64.jsp
Waldfogel, J. (2007) The Tyranny of the Market. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Williams, R. (1968 [1962]) Communications. 
Hardmondsworth: Penguin.
BK-SAGE-ALVARADO_ETAL-140444-Chp01.indd   21 9/19/2014   12:57:51 PM
